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I.  Introduction 
In June 1996 the Florence European Council called for "a report on the evolution of 
the  trade  policies  and  of the  preferential  agreements  of the  Community".  This 
invitation  reflected  a  continuing  debate  within  the  EU  on  this  issue.  Important 
orientations in this debate have already been taken up in:- · 
•  The Commission's Communication "Free Trade Areas:  An Appraisal", 8 March, 
1995 (SEC(95) 322 FINAL); 
•  The Commission's Communication "The Global Chatlcnge of International Trade: 
A Market Access Strategy for the European Union" 15 February, 1996; 
•  Council Conclusions of 22 June, 1995 and 29  October, 1996 consideration ofEU 
regional  agreement  proposals,  and  in  the  preparation  of  Singapore  WTO 
ministerial. 
•  The  Conclusions of the  First  WTO  Ministerial  Conference  in  Singapore  on  13 
December, 1996. 
As  well as  participating fully  in multilateral trade liberalisation the EU also has 
concluded or is  negotiating preferential trading agreements  with various trading 
partners.  These preferential trading agreements, whether taking the form of Free 
Trade  Areas,  Customs Unions  or non-reciprocal  trading  agreements  such as  the 
Lome conventions, are always negotiated to  be in conformity with GATT Article 
XXIV and GATS Article V. They respond to a number of  objectives: 
- Historically, the EU has  used preferential agreements strategically, to provide an 
economic dimension to wider agreements with neighbouring countries, with which 
more general co-operation was envisaged.  Initially, this included Greece, Turkey, 
Malta, Cyprus as well as the EFTA countries and the so-called "first generation" of 
agreements with countries ofNorth Africa and the Middle East. 
- The EU used a similar policy (involving non-reciprocal trade preferences) in the 
Y  aoundc and now Lome Conventions, as  an  instrument of development, and to 
provide an economic dimension to  its  assistance to  former  dependent territories. 
Agreements  between the EU  and  developing  countries which  aim  to  strengthen 
trade and other links can provide support for economic, social and political reforms 
in  the  countries  concerned.  Separately,  the  EU  has  also  promoted  regional 
integration  between  developing  countries,  for  developmental  reasons.  These 
separate arrangements, to  the extent that they  do  not fall  under Article XXIV of 
GATT, arc not the focus of  this paper. 
t1 - More  recently,  similar  considerations  have  applied  to  the  development  of 
preferential agreements in  Central and  Eastern Europe,  where they contribute to 
preparing these countries for possible Community membership.  The objective here 
is therefore significantly more than one of  a close and stable economic relationship. 
As well as serving these transitional and developmental goals, it is also important 
to note that the EU's preferential agreements do serve to open markets by pushing 
forward  a  pattern  of tariff disarmament  in  partner  countries,  helping  them  to 
prepare for further multilateralliberalisation.  This feature of  the EU's agreements 
has  become  more  significant  in  recent  years,  as  the  EU  has  concluded  or  is 
negotiating  in  the  context  of its  new  Mediterranean  policy  new  association 
agreements with Mediterranean partners, which include the establishment of free 
trade areas on a reciprocal basis.  The EU has also  been encouraging partners to 
join the WTO if  they had not clone so. 
Recently, concern has been expressed that the EU's overall pattern of preferential 
agreements has had an unforeseen cumulative impact in the EU's own market (and 
future  WTO  negotiating position),  as  a  result of the  preferential  market  access 
conceded  to  third  countries.  There  has  also  been  concern  that  the  new WTO 
dispute settlement system might create a risk for the EU, if  the WTO conformity of 
a  particular  agreement were  successfully  challenged.  This  internal  debate  has 
paralleled international concern that the number of preferential agreements being . 
put  in  place  by  the  EU  and  others  around  the  world  'threatened'  to  the  WTO 
system. 
Against this background, the strictly limited purpose of  this paper is to suggest how 
the EU should respond to the question of clarifying WTO rules, which was raised 
by the  October GAC  and  put  formallly  on the  WTO  agenda  by  the  Singapore 
Ministerial.  This paper is  not designed to  re-examine the broader range of issues 
addressed in 1995, and on which the Commission position remains unchanged. 
II.  Dehate in the \VTO 
In the WTO, the debate has revolved around two key claims: 
•  That there  has  been a  proliferation  in  the  number of preferential  agreements  111 
recent years, and; 
•  that this has resulted in a threat to the WTO. 
-The proliferation of regional agreements 
The  claim  that  there  has  been  a  'proliferation'  of agreements  needs  careful 
examination.  WTO Secretariat information (set out in summary form in Table 1) 
shows a total of 69 preferential agreements notified under the GATT currently in 
force at the end of 1996, with 39 notified since 1990.  At first sight this confirms 
the view that there  has  been a  sharp  upward  trend  in  notifications  since about 
1990. 
2 But closer examination suggests that this figure is not as alarming as it may seem. 
The only new agreements involving the EC awaiting examination arc those with 
the 10 countries in a pre-accession process with the EU, as well as the final stage 
of the Customs Union with Turkey.  Six of those agreements arc 'with countries 
which did not exist before  1990.  Many of the  other agreements notified since 
1990  arc  similar  EFT  A  agreements,  also  extending  to  Central  and  Eastern 
European countries the sort of  preferential arrangements which have been in place 
in  Western Europe since the  early  1960s.  The WTO  Secretariat data contains 
very  few  examples  of recent  free  trade  agreements  being  concluded  between 
parties  which  arc  not  geographically  contiguous  or  linked  by  other  regional 
arrangements. 
Recently  we  have  seen,  and  it  is  certainly  the  case  in  the  EU,  that  many 
preferential agreements now cover trade in services and that will in its tum mean 
that they will require notification and examination under Article V of  the GATS. 
A  number  of notifications  have  already  been  made  under  the  GATS.  Most 
agreements notified under GATS have also been notified under the GATT for an 
examination of the trade  in goods.  This raises  the  question,  in the  long term, 
whether there should be a single examination of both goods and services aspects 
when examining any economic integration agreement, and whether they should 
be examined on the same basis. 
So  far.  verv  few  of the  agreements  formin~  "backlog"  of notified  hut 
unexamined agreements within the  WTO  involve agreements outside the wider 
European  framework.  The  most  significant  examples  arc  NAFTA  and 
MERCOSUR.  Most of the other agreements involve the EC, EFTA or a range of 
Central and Eastern European countries.  Looking ahead, the EU will be notifying 
the new-generation Mediterranean agreements shortly (these have been concluded 
but  have  yet  to  enter  into  force  with  Tunisia and  Morocco;  negotiations  are 
underway  with  Lebanon,  Jordan,  Egypt  and  the  Palestinian  Authority; 
negotiations  will  begin shortly with  Algeria and  some time  in  the  future  with 
Syria).  In addition, the EU will start negotiations with ACP countries in 1998 on 
the future of  that relationship, including trade matters. 
But it is worth looking further afield, to consider the extent to which third parties 
arc  likely  to  avail  themselves  of Article  XXIV  in  future.  In  addition  to 
MERCOSUR, there  is  a  wide  range  of agreements  in  prospect in  Central  and 
South  America,  including  extensions  of both  MERCOSUR  and  NAFT  A.  In 
addition, preferential agreements arc  likely to  be  formalised within the ASEAN 
countries, and the overall proposal for a Free Trade Area of the Americas remains 
live. 
3 -The threat to the WTQ :o;ystem 
The second claim made  is  that the rise  in the  number of agreements  poses a 
"threat" to the WTO system.  WTO Secretariat analysis confirms the EU's view 
that, on the whole, the effect of regional integration agreements concluded since 
1947  has  been to  create  rather than divert  trade,  and  has therefore  tended  to 
reinforce the benefits of the multilateral system rather than undermine them.  But 
the  WTO  Secretariat  studies  show  that  this  may  have  occurred  despite  the 
operation  of WTO  rules,  rather  than  because  of their  operation.  Hence  the 
conclusion of the WTO Ministerial that  "The expansion and extent of  regional 
trade agreements make it important to analyse whether the system of  WTO rights 
and obligations as it relates to  regional trade  agreements needs to  be further 
clarified".  In conducting this analysis, we will need to  ensure that WTO pays 
due attention to the needs of  the Least Developed.  Since the Least Developed arc 
in  most  cases  (with  the  exception  of Lome)  outside  the  growing  network  of 
preferential agreements involving developed and advanced developing countries, 
the proliferation of such agreements increases the risk of the marginalisation of 
the most vlunerable economies in the world system". 
-The EU approach to this dehate 
The  Council's  view  was  expressed  in  the  debate  leading  to  the  June  1995 
Conclusions, that preferential agreements entered into by the EU and third parties 
should be consistent with WTO rules.  At present the interpretation of those rules 
is difficult and in many cases inconclusive.  The June 1995 Conclusions form the 
basis for the EU's working method to ensure a consistent approach to the issue. 
III.  WTO rules and practice 
.  . 
The wider WTO debate has been complicated by an over-simplified interpretation of 
the  existing  requirements  of GATT Article  XXIV  on  free  trade  area  and  customs 
unions.  This only provides for the contracting parties to  make recommendations in 
circumstances where they consider that the notified agreement is not likely to lead to 
the formation of  a proper free trade area or customs union.  The test is negative rather 
than positive. 
At the same time, there arc  also the  long-standing concerns about the  difficulty of 
properly  interpreting  GATT  Article  XXIV.  Questions  about  the  definition  of 
"substantially all  trade",  as  well  as  the  definition of major sector,  and  the  related 
question of  coverage in terms of  non-traded goods all remain as significant sources of 
uncertainty.  Historically,  the  process  of GATT  examination  and  agreement  on 
proposed agreements broke down in the early  1960s, in the wake of the difficulties 
surrounding  the  establishment of the  EC,. with  subsequent  Working  Party  reports 
containing disagreed conclusions  The result has been to  entrench the uncertainties 
surrounding Article XXIV, while the rest ofthe GATT system has meanwhile evolved 
in the direction of clearer rules and more effective dispute settlement (the latter also 
applicable to Article XXIV).  For many years, there was a tacit acceptance that Article 
XXIV rules would not be interpreted too rigorously.  In part this reflected the fact that 
4 trade  relations  between  major  economies  tended  to  be  on  an  MFN  basis,  with 
preferential arrangements on the whole involving smaller economies, or relationships 
with strong development objectives. In the Uruguay Round, the operation of Article 
XXIV  was  the  subject  of  some  clarification,  in  the  Understa';"lding  on  the 
Interpretation of Article  XXIV,  which  found  part of the  WTO Agreements.  The 
Understanding provided real elements of technical clarification in respect of customs 
unions  and  the  compensation  process  under  Article  XXIV.6,  but  little  else  of 
substance. 
In the WTO, the debate has also been affected by the emergence of the backlog of 
notified but unexamined agreements and the impending need to  begin assessing the 
compatibility of agreements with the provisions of the GATS.  The WTO sought to 
address this through the establishment at the beginning of 1996 of the Committee on 
Regional  Trade  Agreements  (CRTA).  The  CRTA also  has  a  mandate  to  consider 
systemic issues.  Although it has made an energetic and well-organised start, it is too 
soon to judge how successful the CRTA will be.  Satisfactory progress dealing with 
the backlog is an important  clement in any move to clarify WTO rules. 
The situation in respect of services agreements under the GATS is  different.  GATS 
Article  V  provides  for  a  system of notification  and  examination similar to  GATT 
Article  XXIV.  But the  examination  process  involves  a  positive  determination of 
consistency or inconsistency of GATS rules although there is no specific prohibition 
(as  there  is  in  GATT)  on  maintaining  an  agreement  if recommendation  arc  not 
followed.  No examinations have yet been cor.1pletcd under GATS Article V, and it is 
therefore too soon to assess how effective this process is likely to be.  For its part the 
Community  should  seek  to  ensure  that  a  tough,  but  workable  interpretation  is 
developed  which,  while  setting  reasonably  high  standards  for  the  approval  of 
agreements, will nonetheless be attainable. 
The fact that a number of our trading partners arc themselves likely to put preferential 
ngreements in place is a cause for concern. given the uncertainties identified in respect 
of Article  XXIV.  High MFN rates  in  more  advanced  developing  countries  are  a 
market  access  problem  in  themselves,  and  arc  compounded  when  high  rates  are 
accompanied by slightly less high applied rates which can then be increased without 
negotiation and with no compensation for European exporters who lose market access 
as a result.  Our experience with NAFTA also demonstrates that these problems arc 
far  outweighed  by loss of market share  resulting  from  trade  diversion,  where  free 
trade  areas  are  formed  between  countries  where  one  or  more  of the  partners  has 
comparatively high duties on imports from the EU, but zero duties on trade within the 
FT  A.  This  is  possible  because  Article  XXIV  rules  on  free  trade  agreements  arc 
significantly less onerous than those which apply to customs unions. 
The  most  significant  weakness  in  the  rules  on  free  trade  agreements  is  that  the 
obligation not to  raise new barriers  is  related to  rates of duty  and other restrictions 
"applicable" at the formation of the area, rather than those "applied"  (in the case of 
customs unions, the WTO Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV states 
that applied rates shall be used).  The difference in  terminology can be significant: 
where the party entering into the agreement has bound rates significantly higher than 
5 the rates it actually applies,  the "applicable" rate  is  that which is  capable of being 
applied,  i.e.  the  bound rate,  and not the  applied  rate.  This  can  leave  scope  for  a 
country to increase its applied import rates after entering into the free trade agreement 
without having to pay compensation: parties forming a customs union d~ not have this 
option. 
For  the  EU.  the  difference  is  significant:  successive  EU  enlargements  (and  the 
customs  union  with Turkey)  have  been governed  by  the  rules  applied  to  customs 
unions; in addition, the EU tariff is entirely bound at generally very low rates.  The 
alignment of  existing rules for FT  As on these stricter current rules for customs unions 
would help to reduce the scale of the problem of trade distortion - the relative loss of 
access by EU exporters.  Stronger rules on FT  As on these lines would provide further 
downward pressure on bound tariff rates in the more advanced developing countries, 
and would make the multilateral route to  tariff reduction more attractive.  There is 
therefore a real EU interest in  clarifying in  this sense the rules governing changes i"n 
tariff rates following conclusion of  free trade agreements. 
For developing countries,  such changes might be an obstacle to  concluding FTAs, 
although WTO Balance of Payments rules, and safeguard clauses, would continue to 
allow increases in import duty in certain circumstances. 
What effect could these  changes have on EU  agreements?  For the EU's own free 
trade agreements, it is worth noting that almost all of the agreements with countries in 
Central  and  Eastern Europe  arc  intended to  be  a  step  towards  EU accession.  On 
accession these countries would adopt the common external tariff, ending any scope 
to  raise  their  MFN  tariffs.  In  practice,  many  of these  countries  arc  negotiating 
accession to the WTO and arc likely to  do so  on terms in respect of their industrial 
tariffs which will· be  similar to  the common external  tariff in ariy  case.  The other 
sig~ificant  group  of agreements  where  the  EU  is  involved  arc  those  with  the 
Mediterranean  Partners;  here,  other  factors  may  mean  the  partner  countries  are 
unlikely to increase their MFN rates.  Algeria, Jordan and Lebanon arc all now in the 
process of negotiation  for  WTO  accession,  where  they  will  all  face  pressure  from 
other parties to enter into comprehensive bindings at relatively low levels.  In the case 
of Egypt and Jordan, there is  an agreement with the IMF and World Bank to  reduce 
MFN tariff rates. 
It is also worth recalling that the EU encourages developing countries to usc regional 
integration as part of their economic development process.  Many of the agreements 
which result  arc  notified  under the  "enabling clause",  agreed as  part of the  Tokyo 
Round  in  1979  to  enable  special  and  differential  treatment  (and  more  lenient 
application of GATT rules)  to  be  applied  to  developing countries.  This  objective 
remains important for  the EU.  Ideally, it should be  possible to  provide for  clearer, 
stronger rules in respect of FTA's and other regional integration agreements affecting 
developed and more advanced "developing" countries (many of  whom have per capita 
GDP  equivalent  to  EU  Member  States),  while  at  the  same  time  providing  for  a 
genuinely more relaxed regime applicable to developing countries. 
6 The problem with this approach is  ~hat at present the status of  "developing country" is 
decided  on the  basis  of self-selection,  with  many  middle  and  even  upper-income 
countries seeking to enjoy the benefits of  the enabling clause.  A longer term solution 
to this problem would involve tackling in the WTO the question of "graduation" (i.e. 
the  distinction between developed and developing countries),  so  thai more  lenient 
rules  are  clearly  applied  only  to  countries  who  need  them.  This  is  a  politically-
difficult  issue,  which  goes  much  wider  than  regional  integration  and  would 
significantly  complicate  the  task  of clarifying  existing  WTO  rules  on  regional 
integration. 
-Assessment 
What does this analysis mean for the EU's wider interests, both in terms of market 
access and in terms of its own agreements?  Several points emerge from the analysis 
set out above:-
(a)  The debate is  focused on traditional questions of trade in goods and regional 
liberalisation  covering  trade  in  goods.  From  the  EU's  perspective  it  is 
important not to overlook the GATS dimension of  regional integration; 
(b)  The  backlog  of unexamined  agreements  in  the  WTO  CRT  A  remains  a 
practical obstacle to any consideration of  systemic issues or reform; 
(c)  There  arc  indications  that  the  operation  of GATT  Article  XXIV  (already 
marked by uncertainty) is  coming under more strain than before.  There arc 
long-standing concerns about the difficulty of interpreting clements of GATT 
Article  XXIV,  including  the  definition  of  "substantially  all  trade",  the 
definition of a major sector and related questions of  coverage in terms of non-
traded goods; 
(d)  The EU's interest in providing security for its own agreements remains strong. 
But it  is  important to  consider the  extent to  which third parties arc  likely to 
avail themselves of  Article XXIV in future; 
(c)  Clarifying the uncertain clements of Article XXIV would help meet the EU's 
offensive and defensive interests: most EU agreements arc likely to  meet any 
reasonable definition of a  free  trade  area or customs union while the  EU's , 
trading  partners  would  be  obliged  to  follow  similar  rules  in  their  own 
preferential  agreements.  This  would  help  preserve  the  EU's market access 
interests.  Separate  developmental  problems  arc  likely  to  remain  until  the 
wider question of  LDC graduation is tackled; 
(f)  Working to  ensure that a strict, but attainable interpretation of Article V  of 
GATS  is  developed  would  help  meet  the  EU's  offensive  and  defensive 
interests.  In most instances the EU's preferential agreements covering trade in 
services  arc  far-reaching  in  that  they also  cover  other  elements  of a  trade 
policy, such as harmonisation and competition policy, in seeking liberalisation 
7 and  therefore the  EU should have  an  offensive  interest  111  securing a  strict 
interpretation of  Article V. 
IV.  The situation of EU Agreements 
The second significant set of questions in the debate on regional integration l.1as  been 
the debate within the EU on the EU's own preferential agreements.  Table 2 shows 
existing reciprocal preferential agreements, organised by type of agreement, showing 
the  relevant dates  and  WTO  status.  The  EU's  existing  universe  of  preferential 
arrangements  and  agreements  falls  into  three  broad  groups  (with  individual 
exceptions).  These include non-reciprocal measures and agreements, and two broad 
groups of  preferential, reciprocal agreements.  These are all briefly described below. 
- Non-recinrocal arrangements: Lome 
As  part  of its  strategy  to  assist  developing  countries,  the  EU  gives  extensive 
preferential access to its own market on a non-reciprocal  basis through the trade 
provisions of the Lome Convention.  Within these arrangements, the Community 
offers duty-free access for  industrial products and a range of increasingly liberal 
access opportunities for agricultural products from ACP countries. 
In addition the EU offers non-reciprocal preferential market access to countries in 
the Former Yugoslavia, under a complex autonomous regime which is  intended to 
replicate the  concessions offered to  the  Former Yugoslavia under the  agreement 
between the EC and Yugoslavia which ended in 1991. 
The Lome Convention is now covered by a GATT and WTO waiver (although the 
EU continues to consider that it is  covered by the provisions of Article XXIV in 
light of part IV of the GATT).  The EU has said that it will seck a similar waiver 
for the non-reciprocal concessions for Ex-Yugoslav States and Albania. 
-Preferential Agreements with Euronean nartners 
The second  category  is  the  range  of recent  preferential  agreements  the  EU  has 
concluded  in  recent  years  with  its  European  partners.  Three  of these  arc  the 
partners in the European Economic Area Agreement (1992).  Other agreements arc 
with  the  I 0  Central  and  Eastern  European  countries  who  arc  considered  to  be 
possible  candidates  for  accession  to  the  EU  (reflected  in  so-called  "Europe" 
Agreements).  These agreements are characterised by  a commitment to  reciprocal 
industrial free trade over a short transitional period.  Secondly, while agricultural 
trade is covered by the agreements, the extent and pace of libcralisation is  slower, 
often more restrictive and often accompanied by non-tariff controls. Finally, all of 
these agreements include provisions for preferential arrangements covering trade in 
services. 
There arc also long-standing FTAs with EFT  A partners and Switzerland.  In WTO 
terms these older agreements do not show the same level of conformity with WTO 
rules as the EU's more recent agreements. 
8 -Agreements with Mediterranean nartners 
The  third  category of agreement is  with partner countries  in the .Mediterranean 
area.  The first generation of these agreements date from  1976  - 1977 and are in 
most  cases  being  replaced  by  so-called  "new-generation"  Mediterranean 
Agreements.  These  newer  agreements  have  been  concluded  with  Tunisia  and 
Morocco (but have yet to enter into force) and arc under negotiation with Lebanon, 
Egypt, Jordan and later Algeria.  A 1975 Agreement with Israel was "modernised" 
in 1995. 
These agreements arc a significant improvement in WTO terms in comparison to 
the  former  agreements  with  Mediterranean  partners.  In  particular,  there  is  an 
objective of  establishing free trade areas.  This involves reciprocal liberalisation on 
industrial  products  and  gradual,  reciprocal  Iibcralisation  in  agricultural  and 
fisheries products. 
- Other preferential agreements 
As well as these three classes of preferential agreement or arrangement, the EU has 
for example particular preferential agreements in place or in prospect with Turkey, 
Palestine, the GCC and South Africa.  The customs union agreement with Turkey 
is  in place; proposed free  trade agreements with the Palestinian Authority,  South 
Africa and the GCC arc subject to Council Negotiating Directives. 
The nlace of Agricultural Trade in Free Trade Agreements 
Agriculture  is  included  in  most  of our  existing  free  trade  agreements.  Sectoral 
exclusion is not a feature of any recent agreement but total libcralisation of agriculture 
has never been possible because of the need, which has been explicitly recognised in 
some  negotiating  mandates  and  implicit  in  them  all,  to  avoid  conflict  with  the 
common agricultural policy.  The problem of conflict with the common agricultural 
policy would be most acute if unrestricted free access were to be granted under a free 
trade agreement for products where the CAP provides for limits on production, high 
level of external protection and high support prices. The Commission has, however, 
made clear in its alternative strategy paper (COM(95) 607) that the CAP will need to 
develop further in the direction set in  the  1992 reform, which implies lower support 
price and more usc of direct aids.  As this strategy is developed and applied, the risk 
of  conflict between free trade Agreements and the CAP will diminish. 
- Assessment 
A  number of general  conclusions  arise  from  consideration of the  EU's existing 
preferential  agreements  and  arrangements.  The  first  is  that  all  of  these 
arrangemci1ts  involve  a  thorough-going  commitment  to  free  trade  in  industrial 
products, at least so far as the Community's own import regime is concerned.  On 
agricultural  goods,  the  EU's  recent  agreements  arc  characterised  by  careful 
liberalisation within the coverage ofthc agreements concerned. 
9 It  is important to put this in context: GATT Article XXIV has r.cver envisaged that 
a free trade area or customs union would require entirely free trade in all  products 
between the participating members.  It envisaged that the general tests in Article 
XXIV  would  be  met  and  that  substantially  all  the  trade  would  be  liberalised. 
Nevertheless  it  remains  the  case  that  a  more  restrictive  regime  in  agriculture 
remains possible in a manner consistent with Article XXIV provided the sector is 
itself covered and provided there is real  libcralisation within that sector over the 
transitional period. 
V.  Other WTO issues : non-memhers and disnute settlement· 
The EU has a number of reciprocal preferential agreements with countries which arc 
not yet members ofthe WTO.  It is possible to argue that this requires a waiver under 
GATT Article XXIV  .1 0.  But GATT jurisprudence on this point is not clear and there 
is  no  explicit prohibition on  a  WTO  member  entering  a  free  trade  agreement  or 
customs union with a non-member.  In practice, what will count in any particular case 
will  be the views of other WTO members, which arc  likely to  reflect  the  size  and 
economic significance of the country concerned rather than any particular view of the 
rules. In general, waivers and derogations arc an exceptional step. 
There is also the question whether EU agreements face a risk of challenge within the 
WTO Dispute Settlement System and (if they were successfully challenged) what the 
consequences  would  be  for  the  agreement  in  question.  For  free  trade  areas  and 
customs unions,  the absence of a positive opinion "in favour" of the conformity of 
WTO rules is  not significant.  The structure of GATT Article XXIV.7(b) is  that an 
agreement, once notified,  is  to  be  considered  in conformity unless the  Contracting 
Parties (acting collectively) decide it is not.  Preferential agreements covering trade in 
services face a different regime; GATS Article V provides for a positive decision on 
conformity in every case.  GATS rules in this respect have yet to be applied.  The EU 
(a major potential  'user'  of preferential  services  agreements  in  the  context of the 
Europe Agreements) will  have  a  real  interest  in  ensuring  that  GATS  Article  V  is 
applied sensibly and realistically, without becoming so permissive as to  allow other 
WTO members to derogate excessively from core GATS obligations. 
The new WTO Dispute Settlement System involves a binding process which may lead 
to  both unwelcome and unavoidable results.  In the  circumstances of a  successful 
challenge,the  Community may  have  to  act  in  order to  ensure  compliance  with  its 
international obligations.  If no waiver from  WTO obligations could be  obtained (as 
was the case with the Lome Convention), this  may make it  necessary to  amend the 
preferential agreement or to withdraw from it.  The Community would otherwise face 
a prospect of having to offer compensation or to accept withdrawal of concessions by 
the  complainants,  both  of which  would  be  undesirable.  There  is,  however,  no 
obligation to extend to other WTO members any of the provisions of the agreement in 
question. 
10 VI.  Conclusions 
The following possible general conclusions emerge from the analysis set out above:-
(a)  regional agreements, especially free trade areas and customs unions, arc a long-
standing feature of  the GATT and now the WTO system; 
(b)  historically,_GATT Article XXIV has been marked by persistent difficulties of 
interpretation.  However, until recent years it has worked within the GATT with 
comparatively  few  problems,  as  Article  XXIV  became  an  area  of political 
flexibility; but 
(c)  since  1990  a  wider  debate  on  regional  integration  has  emerged  reflecting 
greater  political  interest  in  the  possibilities  of regional  integration  and  in 
potential problems within the WTO system; 
(d)  claims that proliferation of regional  agreements in itself poses a threat to  the 
multilateral system arc  both exaggerated and misleading,  although there  has 
been an increase in the number of agreements notified to  the  WTO and their 
operation therefore does have an increasing impact on world trade; 
(c)  the EU has a real  and growing market access interest in third country markets 
which  could  be  adversely  affected  by  trade  distortions  resulting  from 
preferential agreements, whoever the participants may be; 
(f)  the  EU  also  has  an  interest  in  further  reinforcing  the  positiOn  of its  own 
agreements in the WTO.  There is an unwelcome level of uncertainty in GATT 
rules which do not mesh well with the binding nature of  the Dispute Settlement 
System.  Therefore, while we need to be aware of the need to avoid putting at 
risk our own free  trade agreements, clearer GATT rules  would help both the 
EU's market access  interests  and  its  interest  in  greater certainty  for  its  own 
agreements; 
(g)  Ideally, within a  clarified  Article  XXIV  framework,  the  needs  of developing 
countries should be reflected in a properly focused, flexible framework to allow 
the smooth and gradual integration of developing countries into the multilateral 
trading  system through  regional  trade  agreements  among  themselves  or with 
developed partners.  But this flexibility, of course, would need to be properly 
graduated  according  to  the  level  of development  so  as  not  to  jeopardise the 
legitimate trade interests of  third parties; 
(h)  the EU's own agreements in recent years  show a consistent pattern of policy 
making, including the Europe agreements concluded since  1990 as well as the 
modernisation of historical links with Mediterranean partners and Turkey; 
II (i)  the EU agreements also fit a consistent pattern in terms of  preferences offered to 
partner countries, with a large measure of liberalisation in respect of industrial 
products and a rather less liberalised regime in agricultural products (although 
an improving one).  · 
The  Commission's  overall  conclusion  is  that  the  EU  has  a  clear  interest  in  the 
development of  clearer rules.  The requirement established by the Council in 1995 that 
the Commission.produce studies on the  WTO  conformity and impact on common 
policies  for  each new preferential  agreement proposal  provides  an  added  layer of 
analysis to identify difficulties.  Clearer WTO rules woald help guarantee conformity 
with WTO requirements and take an element of  subjectivity out of  the exercise.  None 
ofthe foregoing argument replaces the need to assess fully the economic and political 
merits of individual proposals for FTAs and other agreements.  But the conclusions 
set out above do point to a strategy to make that process clearer and more effective, 
and 1D.Jllign the EU'  s defensive interests with its wider market access gruili. 
10 January, 1997 
12 TABLE 1 
List of Regional Agreements Notified to the GATT/WTO and Currently in Force
1 
A.  Agreements Notified Under Article XXIV 
Agreement (Unofficial title)  Date of Signature 
1. EEC and EURATOM  25.03.57 
EC - Accession of  Denmark, Ireland and UK  22.01.72 
EC - Greece Accession Agreement  28.05.79 
EEC - Portugal and Spain Accessions  12.06.85 
EC - Austria, Finland, Sweden Accessions  25.06.94 
2. EFTA  04.01.60 
EFT  NFINEFT  A - Iceland Accession  04.12.69 
3. Central American Common Market  13.12.60 
4. Arab Common Market  06.07.62 
5. EEC- Turkey Association Agreement of 1963  12.09.63 
EEC -Turkey Additional Protocol  23.11.70 
EC - Turkey Association Agreement of 1973  30.06.73 
EC - Turkey Customs Union  22.12.95 
6.  EC  - Association  of certain  non-European  countries  and  29.09.70 
territories (PTOM II) 
7.  EC - Malta Association Agreement  05.12.70 
8.  EC - Switzerland I Liechtenstein Agreements  22.07.72 
9. EC- Iceland Agreements  22.07.72 
10. EC - Cyprus Association Agreement  19.12.72 
11. EC -Norway Agreements  14.05.73 
12. CARICOM  04.07.73 
13. EEC- Israel Agreement of 1975  11.05.75 
14. EEC- Algeria Agreements of 1976  26.04.76 
15. EEC- Morocco Agreements  27.04.76 
16. EEC -Tunisia Agreements of 1976  25.04.76 
17. Australia- Papua New Guinea Agreel!lent (PA  TCRA)  06.11.76 
18. EEC - Egypt Interim Agreement of 1977  18.01.77 
19. EEC- Jordan Interim Agreement of 1977  18.01.77 
20. EEC - Lebanon Interim Agreement of 1997  03.05.77 
21. EEC - Syria Interim Agreement of 1977  18.01.77 
22. Australia- New Zealand (ANZCERTA)  28.03.83 
23. Israel - United States Free Trade Area Agreement  22 04.85 
24. Canada- US Free Trade Agreement (CUSFT  A)  02.01.88 
25. EC- Faroe Islands Agreement  02.01.91 
26. EFT  A - Turkey Agreement  10.12.91 
27. EC- Hungary Interim Agreement of 1991  16.12.91 
According to the information within the WTO Secretariat, the agreements listed in this Annex arc 
still in force. 
I~ 28. EC- Poland Interim Agreement of 1991  16.12.91 
29. EFTA- Czech and Slovak Federal Republic Agreement  20.03.92 
30. EFT  A - Israel Free Trade Agreement  17.09.92 
31. Czech Republic and Slovak Republic Customs Union  29.10.92 
32. EFTA- Poland  Agreement  10.12.92 
33. EFTA- Romania Agreement  10.12.92 
34. NAFTA  17.12.92 
35. CEFTA  21.12.92 
36. Faroe Islands - Iceland Free Trade Agreement 
37. Faroe Islands- Norway Free Trade Agreement 
38. Faroe Islands- Switzerland Free Trade Agreement 
39. EEC - Bulgaria Interim Agreement  08.03.93 
40. EFTA - Bulgaria Free Trade Agreement  29.03.93 
41. EFT  A - Hungary Agreement  29.03.93 
42. EC - Czech Rep. Europe Agreement  04.10.93 
43. EC - Slovak Rep. Europe Agreement  04.10.93 
44. EEC - Romania Interim Agreement  01.02.93 
45. EC- Estonia Agreement  18.07.94 
46. EC - Lntvia Agreement  18.07.94 
47. EEC- Slovenia Co-operation Agreement  05.04.93 
48. EC - Lithuania Agreement  18.07.94 
49. Czech Republic- Romania Free Trade Agreement  24.10.94 
50. Slovak Republic - Romania Free Trade Agreement 
51. EFT  A - Slovenia Free Trade Agreement  13.06.95 
52. EFT  A - Estonia Free Trade Agreement 
53. EFTA- Latvia Free Trade Agreement 
54. EFT  A - Lithuania Free Trade Agreement 
2 B.  Agreements Notified Under the Enabling Clause 
Agreement (Unofficial title)  Date of Signature 
1. The Tripartite Agreement (Egypt, India, Yugoslavia)  23.12.67 
2.Protocol  relating  to  Trade  Negotiations  among  Developing  08.12.71 
Countries 
3. Bangkok Agreement  31.07.75 
4. ASEAN preferential Trading Arrangements  24.02.77 
Preferential Tariff Scheme for the A  SEAN 
Free trade area (AFT  A)  28.01.92 
5.  South  pacific  Regional  Trade  Co-operation·  Agreement  14.01.80 
(SPARTECA) 
6. Latin American Integration Association, "LAIN'  12.08.80 
7. Gulf Co-operation Council  08.06.81 
8. GSTP  13.04.88 
9. Lao - Thailand Trade Agreement  20.06.91 
10. MERCOSUR  26.03.91 
11.  Preferential  Tariffs  among  members  of the  Economic  Co- 17.02.92 
operation  Organisation 
12. Andean Pact  12.05.87 
13. South Asian Preferential Trade Arrang'ement (SAPTA)  11.04.93 
14. Common market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA)  05.11.93 
15. 03: Columbia, Venezuela and Mexico Free Trade Agreement 
3 
/( I.  The European Economic Area 
Title of Agreement 
ICELAND  European Economic Area 
LIECHTENSTEIN  European Economic Area 
NORWAY  European Economic Area 
............. 
~ 
TABLE2 
Period of  Validity 
Signed on  2  May  1992.  In  force 
since I January 1994. 
Joined EEA I May, 1995. 
Signed on 2  May  1992.  In  force 
since I January 1994. 
Tvpe of  Agreement 
Extension  of  the  Internal 
Market  (including  a  free  trade 
area  established  by  the  Free 
Trade Agreement of 1972). 
Extension  of  the  Internal 
Market  (including  a  free  trade 
area  established  by  the  Free 
Trade Agreement of 1972) 
Extension  of  the  Internal 
Market  (including  a  free  trade 
area  established  by  the  Free 
Trade Agreements of 1973) 
WTO Status 
EEA notified for information on 
17/7/92  (no  Working  Party 
created) 
Working  Party  report  on 
FTAgreement  of  1972  adopted 
on 19/10/73 
EEA notified for information on 
17/7/92  (no  Working  Party 
created) 
Working  Party  report  on 
FT  Agreement  of  1972  adopted 
on 19/10/73. 
EEA notified for information on 
17/7/92  (no  Working  Party 
created) 
Working  Party  report  on 
FT  Agreement  of  1973  adopted 
on 28/3/74 2.  Customs Union 
TURKEY 
CYPRUS 
tv1ALTA 
ANDORRA 
* 
~ 
Title of Agreement 
Agreement  establishing  an 
Association  between  the 
European Economic Community 
and Turkey 
Decision  Relating to  a  Common 
Position by the Community in the 
EC-Turkey  Association  Council 
on the  implementing of the  final 
phase of  the Customs Union. 
Signed  on  19  December  197'2.. 
Entered  into  force  on  1  June 
1973 for an unlimited period. 
Agreement  establishing  an 
Association  between  the 
European  Economic Community 
and Malta. 
Agreement between the EEC and 
the Principality of  Andorra 
Period ofValiditv 
Signed  on  12  September  1963. 
Entered into force on 1 December 
1963 for an unlimited period. 
Entry into force  on 31  December 
1995. 
Signed  on  19  December  1972. 
Entered into force on 1 June 1973 
for.an unlimited period. 
Sigm.d  on  December  1970. 
Entered into force on 1 April 1971 
for an unliMited period. 
Type of  Agreement  WTO Status 
Prcvides for  the establishment of  Working  Party  report  adopted 
a customs union in three stage.5.  25/3/65 
The  Agreement  includes  a 
reference to the possibility of the 
accession  of  Turkey  to  the 
Community. 
Establishes the final  phase of the 
customs  union  after  the  end  of 
the  transitional  22  year  period 
foreseen  in  the  Additional 
Protocol  to  the  Association 
Agreement. 
Provides  for  the  eventual 
establishment of a customs union 
in two stages. 
Provides  for  the  eventual 
establishment of a customs union 
in two stages. 
Notified  in  December  1995 
before the entry into force. 
Subject  to  examination  by  new 
WTO  Committee  on  Regional 
Agreements. 
Working  Party  report  adopted 
21/6174 
Working  Party  report  adopted 
29/5/72 
Entered  into  force  the  1  January  Provides for the  establishment of  Has not been notified 
1991  for an unlimited period.  a  customs  union  for  industrial 
goods in two stages. 
2 
----------------------------------------------------------··----·-SAN MARINO 
* 
3.  Free Trade Agreements 
Interim Agreement on Trade and 
Customs Union between the EEC 
and the Republic of  San Marino 
3.1  Free Trade Agreement witlt Switzerland 
SWITZERLAND 
........... 
"\) 
Title of  Agreement 
Agreement between the EEC and 
the Swiss Confederation 
Signed  on  27  November  1992. 
Entered into force on 1 December 
1992.  Valid  until  the  entry  into 
force of  the 
Co-operation and  Customs Union 
Agreement  signed  on  16 
December 1991. 
Period ofValidity 
Signed on 22 July 1972.  In force 
since  1  January  1974  for  an 
unlimited period. 
3 
Provides for the  establishment of  Has not been notified 
a customs union. 
Tvpe of  Agreement 
Free Trade area 
WTO Status 
Working  Party  report  adopted 
19/10/73 3.2  Europe Agreements 
HUNGARY 
POLAND 
CZECH REPUBLIC 
SLOVAKIA REPUBLIC 
BULGARIA 
ROMANIA 
:s 
Title of Agreement 
Europe  (association)  Agreement 
between the EC and their MS and 
the Republic of  Hungary 
Europe  (association)  Agreement 
between the EC and their MS and 
the Republic of  Poland 
Europe  (association)  Agreement 
between the EC and their rv1S  and 
the Czech Republic 
Europe  (association)  Agreement 
between the EC and their MS and 
the Slovak Republic 
Europe  (association)  Agreement 
between the EC and their MS and 
the Republic ofBulgaria 
Europe  (association)  Agreement 
between the EC and their MS and 
the Republic of  Romania 
Period ofValiditv 
Signed  on  16  December  1991. 
Entered into force on 1 February 
1994 for an unlimited period 
Signed  on  16  December  1991. 
Entered into force on 1 February 
1994 for an unlimited period 
Signed on 4  October 1993  (held 
up  by  the  splitting  of 
Czechoslovakia).  Entered  into 
force  on  1 February  1995  for an 
unlimited period. · 
Type of  Agreement 
Association  agreement providing 
for free trade and a forerunner to 
possible accession 
Association  agreement providing 
for free trade and a forerunner to 
possible accession 
Association  agreement providing 
for free trade and a forerunner to 
possible accession 
Signed  on 4  October 1993  (held  Association  agreement providing 
up  by  the  splitting  of  for free trade and a forerunner to 
Czechoslovakia).  Entered  into  possible accession 
force  on 1 February  1995 for an 
unlimited period. 
Signed  on  8  March  1993.  Association  agreement providing 
Entered into force on  I  February  for free trade and a forerunner to 
1995 for an unlimited period.  possible accession 
Signed  on  1  February  1993.  Association  agreement providing 
Entered into  force on  I  February  for free trade and a forerunner to 
1995 for an unlimited period.  possible accession 
4 
WTO Status 
Interim Agreement notified April 
92.  First  CRTA  meeting  to 
examine agreement 18  September 
1996 
Interim Agreement notified April 
92.  First  CRTA  meeting  to 
examine agreement 18  September 
1996 
Interim Agreement notified April 
92.  First  CRTA  meeting  to 
examine agreement 18 September 
1996 
Interim Agreement notified April 
92.  First  CRTA  meeting  to 
examine agreement 18 September 
1996 
Interim  Agreement  notified  Dec 
94.  Working Party has not met. 
Now for CRTA. 
Interim  Agreement  notified  Dec 
94.  Working P·arty  has not met. 
Now for CRTA R-> 
0 
Europe Agreement to be ratified 
ESTONIA 
* 
LATVIA 
* 
LITHUANIA 
* 
SLOVENIA 
Iitle of  Agreement 
Europe  Agreement  between  the 
EC  and  their  MS  and  the 
Republic of  Estonia 
Europe  Agreement  between  the 
EC  and  their  MS  and  the 
Republic of Latvi1 
Europe  Agreement  between  the 
EC  and  their  MS  and  the 
Republic of  Lithuania 
Europe  Agreement  between  the 
EC  and  their  MS  and  the 
Republic of  Slovenia 
Period ofValidi!)::  Tvpe of Agreement  WTO Status 
Signed on 12 June 1995  Association  agreement providing  FTAgreement notified June 1995. 
for free trade and a forerunner to  Working Party has not met 
possible accession 
Signed on 12 June 1995  Association  agreement providing  FTAgreement notified June 1995. 
for free trade and a forerunner to  Working Party has not met 
possible accession 
Signed on 12 June 1995  Association  agreement providing  FTAgreement notified June 1995. 
for free trade and a forerunner to  Working Party has not met 
possible accession 
Signed on 10 June 1996  Association  agreement providing  Not yet notified 
for free trade and a forerunner to 
possible accession 
5 .. 
,s:z_, 
3.3  New Generation ofJUediterranean Agreements 
The  final  goal  of Euro-1\lediterranean co-operation is  to  establish a Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area by  the year 2010 (including free  trade between all  the parties with whom the Community has 
signed/ will sign an Agreement).  ' 
TUNISIA 
ISRAEL 
:-.lOROCCO 
Title of Agreement 
Euro-Mediterranean  Agreement 
establishing  an  association  between 
the  EC  and  their  tvlS  and  the 
Republic of  Tunisia 
Period ofV8Iidity 
Signed on  17 July 1995. 
Currently  party  to  Co-operation 
Agreement  with  the  EEC,  including 
preferential  non-reciprocal  access 
to  the EC market.  Signed 25  April 
1976 
Euro-Mediterranean  Agreement  Signed on 20 November 1995 
establishing  an  association  between 
the EC and their MS and the State of 
Israel 
Euro-Mediterranean  Agreement 
establishing  an  association  between 
the  EC  and  their  tvlS  and  the 
Kingdom of Morocco. 
Currently  party  to  Co-operation  and 
Free  Trade  Agreement  with  the 
EEC. Signed  II May 1975 
Provisional agreement reached on  15 
November 1995. 
Currently  party  to  Co-operation 
Agreement  with  the  EEC,  including 
preferential  non-reciprocal  access 
to  the EC market.  Signed 27  April 
1976. 
6 
Type of Agreement  WTO Status 
Association  agreement  providing  for  Not yet notified 
free trade 
Working  Party  report  on  the  Co-
operation  Agreement  of  1976 
adopted 11/11177 
Association  agreement  providing for  Not yet notified 
free trade 
Working  Party  report  on  the  Co-
operation and  Free Trade Agreement 
of 1975 adopted 1517176 
Association  agreement providing  for  Not yet notified 
free trade 
Working  Party  report 
operation  Agreement 
adopted 11/11177 
on  the  Co-
of  1976 ~ 
"-.) 
New Generation J!editerranean Agreements in Negotiation 
EGYPT 
JORDAN 
* 
LEBANON 
* 
Title of  Proposed Agreement  State ofNegotiations 
Euro-Mediterranean  Agreement  Negotiations  for  new  generation 
establishing  an  association  agreements in progress. 
between the EC and their MS and 
the Arab Republic of Egypt 
Currently  party  to  Co-opo::ration 
Agreement  with  the  EEC, 
including  preferential  non-
reciprocal  access  to  the  EC 
market. 
Signed 18 January 1977 
Euro-Mediterranean  Agreement  Negotiations  for  new  generation 
establishing  an  association  agreements in progress. 
between the EC and their MS and 
the  Hashemite  Kingdom  of 
Jordan. 
Currently  party  to  Co-operation 
Agreement  with  the  EEC, 
including  preferential  non-
reciprocaL access  to  the  EC 
market.  Signed  18  January 
1977. 
Euro-Mediterranean  Agreement  Negotiations  for  new  generation 
establishing  an  association  agreements in progress. 
bet\veen the EC and their MS and 
the Lebanese Republic 
7 
Type of  Agreement envisaged  WTO Status 
Association  agreement  providing 
for free trade 
Association  agreement  providing 
for free trade 
Association  agreement  providing 
for free trade 
Working Party report on the Co-
operation  Agreement  of  1977 
adopted 17/5178 
Working Party report on the Co-
operation  Agreement  of  1977 
adopted 17/5178 Currently  party  to  Co-operation 
Agreement  with  the  EEC, 
including  preferential  non-
reciprocal  access  to  the  EC 
market  Signed  18  January 
1977. 
3.4  Free Trade Agreement with the Gulf  Co-operation Council in Negotiation 
GULF 
COUNCIL 
Bahrain 
Kuwait 
Oman 
* 
UAE 
Saudi Arabia 
* 
CO-OPERATION 
Title of  Proposed Agreement 
Co-operation Agreement bet\veen 
the EEC and the countries parties 
to the Charter of  the Co-operation. 
Council for the Arab States of  the 
Gulf 
State of  Negotiations 
Signed on  15  June  1988,  for  an 
unlimited  period.  Entered  into 
force on 1 January 1990. 
Council negotiating directives for 
a  FT  A  were  issued  in  1991,  but 
negotiations  have not  progressed 
since. 
According  to  the  Commission 
Communication of 22 November 
1995,  the  Commission  seeks  to 
identify  with  its  GCC 
counterparts  the  obstacles  to 
progress in  the FT  A negotiations 
with  a  view  to  relaunching  the 
negotiations. 
8 
Type of Agreement envisaged 
Agreement  providing  for  co-
operation in an number economic 
sectors.  Dialogue  has  been 
resumed on a much broader basis, 
examining  the  possibility  of 
developing  a  free-trade 
agreement with the GCC 
(GCC  customs  union  required 
before  the  signature  of  the 
FT  Agreement with the EC) 
Working Party report on the Co-
operation  Agreement  of  1977 
adopted 17/5178 
\VTO Status 
No  notification  required  at  this 
stage 3.5  Negotiating Directil•es for Free Trade Agreements in discussion in tile Council 
South Africa 
Mexico 
~ 
~ 
Title of Proposed Agreement 
Agreement  for  Trade  and  Co-
operation 
Economic  Partnership  and 
Political Concertation Agreement 
State of  negotiations 
Negotiating Directives  agreed  by 
the Council. 
Negotiating  directives  agreed  by 
the Council on 25 June 1996. 
9 
State of Agreement envisaged 
The  proposed  Agreement  would 
establish a free trade area 
The  proposed  Agreement  would 
cover economic,  commercial and 
other  co-operation  and  political 
concertation.  The objective  is to 
gradually  "establish  a 
framework  to  encourage  the 
development  of trade  in  goods, 
services and investment, inter alia 
through  bilateral  progressive 
and  reciprocal  liberalisation  of 
trade  in  goods,  on  a  basis  and 
timetable to  be  agreed  by a new 
joint Council." 
On trade, the mandate is to create 
a Joint Committee responsible for 
deciding  the  timetable  and 
modalities  for  the  bilateral, 
reciprocal  and  progressive 
reduction  of tariff and  non-tariff 
barriers  to  trade,  in  accordance 
with  the  relevant WTO  rules  and 
taking  account  of the  sensitivity 
of certain products. 
WTO Status 
Will  have  to  be  notified  upon 
conclusion  of  the  FTA 
negotiations 
Would have to be notified upon 
conclusion  if an  FTA  resulted 
negotiations. stJ  ......,..., 
4.  Preferential, Non-Reciprocal Libera!isation Agreements 
4.1  Lome Convention 
Title of  Agreement 
ACP COUNTRIES  Fourth ACP-EC Convention 
Period ofValidity 
Signed  on  IS  December  1989. 
Entered  into  force  on  1  March 
1990 for a 10 year period. 
Type of Agreement 
A  preferential,  non-reciprocal 
agreement  covering  trade  in 
goods,  establishment  and 
operation  of companies,  current 
payments and capital movements. 
It mentions the long-term aim of 
a  progressive  liberalisation  of 
trade in services. 
4.2.  ,l[editerranean Agreements of  tile old Geueration (in addition to tlte ,lfediterranean Agreemellts of  tire old Generation listed under 3.2) 
ALGERIA 
* 
SYRIA 
* 
Title of  Agreement 
Co-operation Agreement between 
the  EEC  and  the  People's 
Democratic Republic of Algeria 
Co-operation Agreement between 
the  EEC  and  the  Syrian  Arab 
Republic 
Period ofValidity 
Signed 26  April  1976.  Entered 
into force on 1 November 1978. 
Signed 18 January 1977.  Entered 
into force on I November 1978 
10 
Type of  Agreement 
Co-operation  Agreement, 
including  preferential  non-
reciprocal  access  to  the  EC 
market. 
Co-operation  Agreement, 
including  preferential  non-
reciprocal  access  to  the  EC 
market. 
WTO Status 
Working  Party  report  adopted 
4/10/94 
A  GATT  waiver  has  been 
granted by the Contracting Parties 
in December 1994, now extended 
to  2000,  when  the  Convention 
expires. 
WTO Status 
Working Party report adopted on 
11111177 
Working Party report adopted on 
17/5178 ~ 
~ 
4.3  Agreements em•isaged with tile countries of  tile former Yugoslal•ia 
CROATIA 
FYR0!\1 
* 
*  Not a member of \VTO 
Title of Proposed Agreement 
Co-operation Agreement 
Co-operation Agreement 
State ofNegotiations 
Negotiations  have 
suspended  since  4  August 
for political reasons. 
been 
1995 
Agreement initialled on 20 June, 
1996 
11 
Tvpe of Agreement envisaged  \VTO Status 
Preferential  non-reciprocal  Waiver to be needed. 
access to the EC market 
Preferential  non-reciprocal  Waiver to be needed. 
access to the EC market 